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Justice Powell joined by Justice O'Conner (concurring) concluded that there were
historical associations of creation-science
with the religious belief in the creation of
the universe by a divine God as described
in the Bible. These associations, according
to Justice Powell, were enough to overricj.e
the fact that the statute did not explicitly
refer to a religious purpose.
The Court did leave the door open for
religious oriented information and
creation-science to be used in public
schools; but the purpose must not advance
a particular religious belief.
Edwards v. Aquillard follows closely the
trend of Supreme Court decisions dealing
with state statutes addressing religion in
public schools. The Establishment Clause
is being relied upon in the Court's

involvement in state educational law, an
area in which the state and local governments have a large interest. In recent years
the Court has invalidated a school district's use of public school teachers in religious schools. Grand Rapids School
District v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985), and
the hanging of a copy of the Ten Commandments on a public school wall. Stone
v. Gragam, 449 U.S. 39 (1980). In these
two cases the Court found no secular purpose. Edwards also illustrates that in determining the presence of secular purpose the
Court will go beyond the definitions in
the statute to find the motives of the legislature. This is one reason why Justice Scalia has called for a re-evaluation of the
Lemon secular purpose test.

-David G. Banister

The accident took seconds. The rehabilitation took months. ~
But with the help of Easter Seals, and a burning spirit, what you . 1't' f .
see here is not a man with a disability, but a man called Dad.
Give to Easter Seals. Give the power to overcome.
U"
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Lee v. Wheeler: RECOVERY FOR
NEGUGENCEOFPHANTOM
DRIVER UNDER UNINSURED
MOTORIST PROVISIONS
On a question certified by the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia, the Court of Appeals of
Maryland held in Lee v. Wheeler, 310 Md.
233, 528 A.2d 912 (1987) that under an
automobile insurance policy covering
Maryland insureds, an uninsured motorist
provision limiting coverage to situations in
which there is physical contact between
the insureds' vehicle and the phantom
vehicle is unenforceable as against public
policy under Maryland law. This case
expanded a similar ruling in State Farm

Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Maryland Auto. Ins.
Fund, 227 Md. 602, 356 A.2d 560 (1976) by
making such provisions unenforceable for
accidents happening outside, as well as
inside, the State of Maryland.
Ark and Olivia Lee were residents of
Maryland whose automobile was titled
and registered in Maryland. The original
insurance policy and all renewals were
addressed and mailed to the Lees'
Maryland residence and all premiums were
paid from the same residence. While the
Lees were operating their vehicle in the
District of Columbia, a vehicle operated
by Marlene Wheeler swerved to avoid an
unidentified (phantom) vehicle that suddenly entered her lane of traffic. In the
process, Wheeler struck the Lees' vehicle
head-on.
The Lees brought an action against
Wheeler in the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia invoking diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.c.
§ 1332 (1982). The Lees also joined their
insurer, Pennsylvania General Insurance
Company (Pennsylvania General), seeking
coverage under the policy's uninsured
motorist provisions for the damages sustained as a result of the phantom's negligence.
The Lees' claim against Pennsylvania
General was dismissed because the district
judge found that the Lees' insurance policy
expressly required physical contact with
the phantom vehicle in order for the uninsured motorist coverage provisions to apply and that provision was enforceable
under District of Columbia law. The Lees
appealed from the order granting the
motion to dismiss.
The United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit found
that Maryland law applied but found no
pertinent Maryland cases to serve as a
guide in making a decision. Under Md.
Cts. & Jud. Proc. Code Ann. § 12-601
(1984), they certified the following ques-
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tion to the Court of Appeals of Maryland:
"Under an automobile insurance policy
covering Maryland insureds, is a provision
in that policy requiring physical contact
between the insureds' vehicle and the
phantom vehicle lawful and enforceable
under Maryland law where the accident
occurs outside the State of Maryland?" Lee
v. Wheeler, 810 F.2d 303, 304 (D.C. Cir.
1987).
In answering "no" to the question,
Judge Adkins reviewed the principle in
State Farm and expanded it to encompass
accidents happening outside Maryland
involving Maryland insureds.
In State Farm, the Maryland Automobile
Insurance Fund (MAIF) sought a declaration that an insurance policy requiring, as
a prerequisite to coverage, physical contact
between an insured's vehicle and a phantom vehicle violated the uninsured motorist provision of Md. Ann. Code art. 48A,
§ 541(c) (1957, 1986 Repl. Vol.) which
mandates that "[i]n no case shall the uninsured motorist coverage be less than the
coverage afforded a qualified person under
Md. Ann. Code art. 48A §§ 243H and 2431." Id. at 237, 528 A.2d at 914.
Section 243H(a)(1) allows claims for the
death of or personal injury to qualified
persons "arising out of the ownership,
maintenance or use of a motor vehicle in
this State where the identity of the motor
vehicle and of the operator and owner
thereof cannot be ascertained .... " Claims
against MAIF are authorized without any
distinction between impact and nonimpact phantom drivers. State Fann, 227
Md. at 604,356 A.2d at 562.
Pennsylvania General argued that, due
to the "in this state" language, "§ 541(c)
contains an implied territorial limitation
when read in harmony with §
243H(aX1)." 310 Md. at 238, 528 A.2d at
915.
The court explained that "[t]he primary
purpose of the § 541(a) uninsured motorist
coverage requirement is to assure financial
compensation to the innocent victims of
motor vehicle accidents who are unable to
recover from financially irresponsible
uninsured motorists." 310 Md. at 238,528
A.2d at 915 (quoting Pennsylvania Nat'l
Mut. v. Gartelman, 288 Md. 151, 157, 416
A.2d 734, 737 (1980)).
Hesitant to imply exclusions or recognize exclusions beyond those expressly
enumerated by the legislature, the court
observed that no territorial exclusion or
limitation is evident within the two
express exclusions from mandatory minimum uninsured motorist coverage found
in § 541(cX2). Furthermore, the language
on which Pennsylvania General relied
deals with claims against MAIF rather than

with mandatory motor vehicle liability
insurance. Due to the legislative history of
the sections, there is
a functional continuity of purpose in
the present MAIF provisions that militate against reading § 243H as in any
way qualifying § 541(c)(2) .... The
provision for compulsory automobile
insurance, plus the creation of MAIF
as a liability insurer of last resort, demonstrate the dramatic change in state
policy with respect to protection of
the public from the economic harm
produced by automobile accidents.
310 Md. at 240, 528 A.2d at 916.
Judge Adkins went on to say that "[t]o
insert exclusions by implication or recognize exclusions not expressly prohibited
by the statute has the dangerous potential
of seriously frustrating the policies behind
compulsory automobile liability insurance." Id. at 242,528 A.2d at 917. To allow
such exclusions "would fly in the face of
the broadly-protective public policy"
established through recent case law. Id. at
243, 528 A.2d at 917.
The court declined to express an opinion
on whether Maryland law prohibits a
physical contact requirement in uninsured
motorist coverage in commercial policies
as opposed to personal policies. 310 Md. at
235-36 n. 1, 528 A.2d at 913.
The Court of Appeals of Maryland
expanded the principle of State Farm by
finding an uninsured motorist provision,
limiting coverage to situations in which
there is physical contact between the
insureds' vehicle and the phantom vehicle,
unenforceable against public policy under
Maryland law even when the collision
occurs outside the State of Maryland. By
upholding the primary purpose of the
uninsured motorist coverage requirement,
this ruling assures financial compensation
to the innocent victims of motor vehicle
accidents who are unable to recover from
financially irresponsible uninsured motorists.

-Glen P. Smith

Ellison v. Maryland: CONVICTED
AND SENTENCED CRIMINAL
DEFENDANT WHEN CALLED AS
NON-PARTY WITNESS MAY
INVOKE PRIVILEGE AGAINST
SELF-INCRIMINATION
In Ellison v. Maryland, 310 Md. 244, 528
A.2d 1271 (1987), the Court of Appeals of
Maryland held that one who has been convicted and sentenced in a criminal proceeding may invoke the fifth amendment
privilege against self-incrimination when
called to testify as a non-party witness in a
subsequent proceeding provided that the
thirty-day time limit for taking an appeal
or requesting a sentence review has not
expired. The Court of Special Appeals of
Maryland had similarly held the privilege
applicable but had based their decision on
a rationale which the court of appeals
found to be unsupported by precedent.
Clinton Ellison and Tyrone Little,
inmates at the Maryland Penitentiary,
were charged in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City with the robbery and first
degree murder of fellow inmate Charles
Sneed. Additionally, Ellison and Little
were charged with lesser included substantive offenses and the state filed notices of
intent to seek the death penalty.
The defendants were tried separately,
with the first case against Little. After closing arguments, but before a jury verdict
was returned, the state and Little entered
into a plea agreement. Little agreed to
plead guilty to second degree murder in
return for the state's promise to nol pros
the first degree murder charge as well as
the robbery and lesser charges. The state
also agreed to recommend a twenty-five
year jail sentence to be served concurrently with Little's prior sentence. The agreement was carried out as proposed and
Little was sentenced on June 18, 1984. At
that time the trial court advised Little that
he had thirty days in which to request
either an appeal of his conviction to the
court of special appeals or a review of his
sentence by a three judge panel of the circuit court.
Ellison's trial began on June 25, 1984,
seven days after Little had been sentenced.
During the course of the trial, and before
Little's thirty-day period in which to
request an appeal or sentence review had
expired, Little was called by Ellison to testify as a witness for the defense. Little
invoked the fifth amendment privilege
against self-incrimination and refused to
testify. The trial court upheld Little's
invoking of the privilege and Ellison was
subsequently found guilty of first degree
murder and robbery. He was sentenced to
life imprisonment for the murder and
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